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RECENT DECISIONS
servient to the title of another," 1r thus adhering to the concept enun-
ciated in La Frambois v. Jackson.
As a result of the decision in the present case, the party at-
tempting to show adverse possession now has a more difficult task
than previously. Evidently, mere possession and cultivation of the
.land will no longer suffice to establish the claim of right "I now de-
manded; but exactly what additional facts are necessary is not clear.
There is a strong dissent to this change,17 based on the reasoning
that "[t] he object of the statute is that the real owner may, by the
unequivocal acts of the usurper, have notice of the hostile claim, and
thereby be called upon to assert his legal title." 18 If this latter view
is correct, then it seems improper to require more than the mere
possession and cultivation that has hitherto sufficed to give this
notice.
The majority of American jurisdictions recognize that the fun-
damental requisites for adverse possession are physical possession and
proper cultivation, and that these will give rise to a claim of right.
The present view in New York, however, is that these two elements
do not spell out a claim of right.19 The failure to define this claim
of right, or the hostility with which it is equated, leaves the courts
without a workable criterion of what constitutes adverse possession.
M
TORTS - LIBEL - REPORTS OF SEALED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
NOT PRIVILEGED.-This libel action was brought against defendant
for its publication of material contained in pleadings filed by plain-
tiff's wife in a separation action and sealed by court rules. The privi-
15Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N. Y. 240, 100 N. E. 742 (1913); Barnes v.
Light, 116 N. Y. 34, 22 N. E. 441 (1889).
Is Accord, De Forrest v. Bunnie, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 396, 401 (Sup. Ct. 1951)
(Possession, to be adverse, need not be under color of title, but must be with
a claim of right.) ; Evans v. Francis, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
17 See Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N. Y. 95, 102, 106 N. E. 2d 28, 31
(1952) (dissenting opinion, see note 3 supra).
Is See St. William's Church v. New York, 296 N. Y. 861, 863, 864, 72 N. E.
2d 604, 605 (1947) (dissenting opinion by Fuld, J.).
19 With respect to acts of improvement as an essential element, the court
in deciding that the acts in the instant case did not suffice, laid some emphasis
on the fact that the work was done by the defendant with knowledge that the
land was not his. Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N. Y. 95, 99, 106 N. E. 2d
28, 30 (1952). Query: Will the court now construe the fact of the settler's
knowledge of no record title in his favor as militating against the establishment
of adverse possession? See the dissenting opinion in the Van Valkenburgh
case, supra at 102, 106 N. E. 2d at 31-32, wherein Judge Fuld contends that
it should not.
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lege accorded full and fair reports of judicial proceedings was
pleaded by the defendant as a defense. Plaintiff's motion to strike
out this defense, on the ground that the rule which sealed the
pleadings:' also withheld the privilege claimed, was granted. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the privilege granted to the
reports of public judicial proceedings does not extend to records that
are sealed by the Rules of Civil Practice.2 Danziger v. Hearst Corp.,
304 N. Y. 244, 107 N. E. 2d (1952).
From early common law through present statutes, a privi-
lege has been granted to full and fair reports of judicial pro-
ceedings.8 The reasons advanced were that a well informed public,
and a greater assurance that justice will be properly administered,
are best promoted by this rule. 4 Courts, however, fearing that the
privilege would be abused by the indiscriminate publication of mat-
ters in the record, sought to prevent dissemination of this information
by limiting the privilege to public proceedings. 5
Against the background of these considerations, some states, in-
cluding New York,6 enacted statutes granting the privilege to re-
ports of legislative, judicial and other proceedings. 7 These statutes,
however, failed to define adequately the limitations of this privilege,
and its precise application in cases involving filed pleadings.
The majority of states, at one time including New York,8 have
construed these laws to mean that the privilege arises only after there
I N. Y. RULs Civ. PRAc. 278 (1952). "An officer of a court with whom
the proceeding in an action to annul a marriage or for divorce or separation
are filed, or before whom the testimony is taken, or his clerk . . .shall not
permit a copy of any of the pleadings or testimony, or any examination or
perusal thereof, to be taken by any other person than a party, or the attorney
or counsel of a party who had appeared in the cause, except by order of the
court."
2 In addition, the court ruled that the facts, if substantiated, would consti-
tute a partial defense under the New York Civil Practice Act § 338, which
states that damages may be mitigated upon proof of the source of the infor-
mation and the grounds of the belief.
3 "The rule is not questioned that a full, fair and impartial report of a
judicial proceeding is qualifiedly privileged. That was the rule at common law
and the statutes of this state so provide." Lee v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co.,
209 N. Y. 245, 247, 103 N. E. 155, 156 (1913).
4 Lee v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., supra note 3 at 248, 103 N. E. at 156;
see Rudd v. Hazard, 266 N. Y. 302, 307, 194 N. E. 764, 765 (1935).
5 See Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N. W. 731, 734
(1888); ODGERS, LiBEL AND SLANDER 314 (5th ed. 1911).
O N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 337. "A civil action cannot be maintained ...
for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial, legislative or
other public and official proceedings. . . ." (emphasis added).
7 CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(4) (Deering, 1949); GA. CODE § 105-704 (1933);
THROCKMORTON'S OHIO CODE §§ 11343-1, 11343-2 (Baldwin, ed. 1948).8 Williams v. N. Y. Herald Co., 165 App. Div. 529, 150 N. Y. Supp. 838
(1st Dep't 1914); see Stuart v. Press Pub. Co., 83 App. Div. 467, 478, 82
N. Y. Supp. 401, 408 (1st Dep't 1903).
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has been a hearing or other judicial action on the pleadings.' It was
realized that, whereas on the one hand testimony in open court is
open to prompt rebuttal and therefore less likely to contain exag-
gerated, unsupported charges; on the other hand, filed pleadings are
usually not immediately contested and are easily withdrawn, and
hence might well contain unfounded accusations, that, if published,
would ruin reputations.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the court, in Campbell v.
N. Y. Evening Post,'0 rebelled against the majority construction, and
granted the privilege to pleadings merely filed with the court." The
Court of Appeals was swayed by the argument that the advantages
of logically applying the privilege outweighed the possibility of its
abuse.'2 This interpretation has since been followed in many juris-
dictions not already bound by precedent to the contrary.13
In 1847, prior to the statute granting the privilege, the Supreme
Court of New York promulgated a rule sealing the testimony and
filed pleadings in "an action founded on adultery." 14  With the ad-
vent of the Campbell case, an apparent conflict developed between the
interpretation of the statute in this decision and the above-mentioned
court rule. This disparity existed for almost three decades until
presented to the Appellate Division in Stevenson v. News Syndicate,G
wherein it was decided that the privilege did not attach to sealed
pleadings.' 6 That conclusion is reiterated in the instant litigation.
9 Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884); Sanford v. Boston Herald
Travelers Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 61 N. E. 2d 5 (1945); see Park v. Detroit
Free Press, 72 Mich. 561, 40 N. W. 731, 734 (188); 3 REsTATEMENT, ToRTs§ 611, comment c (1938) ; see Note, 52 A. L. R. 1438 (1928).
10245 N. Y. 320, 157 N. E. 153 (1927).
21 "We may as well disregard the overwhelming weight of authority else-
where and start with a rule of our own consistent with practical experience.
"Therefore, we proceed to the logical conclusion and uphold the
claim of privilege on the ground that the filing of a pleading is a pzblic and
official act in the course of judicial proceedings." (emphasis added). Campbell
v. N. Y. Evening Post, supra note 10 at 328, 157 N. E. at 156.
12 See Campbell v. N. Y. Evening Post, supra note 10 at 326, 157 N. E.
at 155.
"3Lybrand v. State Co., 179 S. C. 208, 184 S. E. 580 (1936); Kurata v.
Los Angeles News Pub. Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 224, 40 P. 2d 520 (1935) ; Paducah
Newspaper, Inc. v. Bratcher, 274 Ky. 220, 118 S. W. 2d 178 (1937); see Note,
104 A. L. R. 1124 (1936).
14 N. Y. RUr.Es Civ. PRAc. § 118 (1847). The only major change was made
in 1921 when the words "an action to annul a marriage or for divorce or
separation" were substituted for "an action founded on adultery." N. Y. RuI.s
Civ. PRAc. 278 (1921), as re-enacted, N. Y. RULEs Cn'. PRac. 278 (1952), see
note 1 supra.
25276 App. Div. 614, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 751 (2d Dep't), aff'd on other grounds.
302 N. Y. 81, 96 N. E. 2d 187 (1950).
16 But cf. Stolow v. Hearst Corp., 105 N. Y. S. 2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
The court distinguished the cases in the following language: "In the . . .
[Stolow] case . . . the affidavit which furnishes the content of the published
report was submitted, opposition papers were submitted, the motion was heard
19521]
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In the principal case, the statute was construed to grant the
privilege to public judicial proceedings, since any other construction
would defeat the public policy behind the statute. The privilege is
thereby denied whenever the proceedings have been made private
by court rules sealing the record.
Although the decision is sufficiently broad to encompass other
sealed matter,17 nevertheless, it may be limited to the specific type
of matter here involved, that is, filed pleadings in matrimonial ac-
tions. The rule, as a practical matter, should not be extended to
cover sealed testimony. The latter conclusion is supported by the
distinct legal histories,'8 public policies and practical considerations
attending testimony and filed pleadings.
Viewed practically, the decision would curtail undesirable news-
paper sensationalism, which in turn would implement the protection
of public morals, especially of young and impressionable adolescents.
A further result of this case will be the protection of the reputation
of those so often falsely accused as correspondents in matrimonial
actions.
TORTS - MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR ILLEGAL AcTs OF THIRD
PARTIES.-Plaintiff sued on a negligence theory to recover damages
for injuries caused by fireworks illegally discharged ' by invitees in
defendant-municipality's park. Defendant's employees had previ-
ously seen, but had not stopped, similar fireworks. Although an ad-
mission fee was normally charged, none was required at the time of
the injury, nor were the above-mentioned employees present. The
and . . . relief was awarded . . . ." Whereas in the Stevenson case ". . . the
published report was the contents of the affidavit of the plaintiff . . . made in
support of a motion .... The affidavit and notice of motion were served and
filed in court. No opposition papers were served or filed and the motion was
never submitted or argued but was withdrawn." Id. at 288. Judgment was
rendered for the defendant, the court holding that Rule 278 did not take away
the privilege.
17 As, for example, the records and documents relating to the admission or
discipline of attorneys, or for the confinement of the mentally ill. N. Y. JUD.
LAW §90(10); N. Y. MEN. HYG. LAW §74(6).
Is With the exception of a few early cases, the courts have consistently
recognized the applicability of the privilege to reports of testimony. Only
recently have merely-filed pleadings come within the scope of the privilege.
Moreover, to extend the rule to include sealed testimony would appear to be
a futile act in view of the fact that spectators are often allowed to witness the
testimony as it is given. Thus they could disseminate what the court had
sealed.
1iN. Y. PENAL LAW § 1894(a) (2).
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